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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee 
v. 
RUSSELL CATALANO, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 940367-CA 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated Section 78-4-11 (1994), and Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the lower court erred in concluding the state had carried its burden of proof 
after the court found there was no evidence independent of the defendant's confession to 
establish that the driver had left the scene of the accident? 
This issue should be reviewed under a "correction of error" standard. State v. 
Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256, 1271 (Utah 1993); State v. Haves. 860 P.2d 968, 971 (Utah App. 
1993). 
This issue was originally raised at trial in January of 1992 (R. 193 at 51-55). It was 
raised again at the hearing held on remand from this court in January of 1994 (R. 259). 
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CONTROLLING CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-29 (1988) 
(1) The operator of a vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to or 
death of any person shall immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the 
accident or as close to it as possible and shall immediately return to and 
remain at the scene until he has fulfilled the requirements of Section 41-6-31. 
The stop may not obstruct traffic more than is necessary. 
(2) A person failing to stop or to comply with the requirements of Subsection (1) is 
guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
Utah Code Annotated § 41-2-136 (Supp. 1991) 
(1) A person whose license has been denied, suspended, disqualified, or revoked 
under this chapter and operated any motor vehicle upon the highways of this state 
while that license is denied, suspended, disqualified, or revoked shall be punished as 
provided in this section. 
(2) A person convicted of violation of Subsection (1), other than a violation specified 
in Subsection (3), is guilty of a class C misdemeanor. 
(3)(a) A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor whose conviction under 
Subsection (1) is based on his operating a vehicle while his license is suspended or 
revoked for: 
(i) a refusal to submit to a chemical test under Section 41-6-44.10. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Mr. Hansen was tried and convicted at bench trial on January 30, 1992, of leaving 
the scene of an injury accident, a Class A misdemeanor in violation of Utah Code Annotated 
Section 41-6-29, and driving with a suspended license, a Class B misdemeanor in violation of 
Utah Code Annotated Section 41-2-136 (R. 193). At trial, Mr. Hansen moved for a 
dismissal of both counts arguing that the State had not met its burden by establishing the 
corpus delicti by independent, clear and convincing evidence before admitting Mr. Hansen's 
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confession that he was the vehicle's driver at the time of the accident (R. 193 at 51-55). The 
court denied Mr. Hansen's motion to dismiss (Id.). 
On March 26, 1992, Mr. Hansen appeared for sentencing, and the court sentenced 
him in an unsigned order. On May 6, 1992, the court held a hearing to review the sentence 
and stayed the sentence for thirty days pending the perfection of an appeal by Mr. Hansen. 
A notice of appeal was filed by Mr. Hansen on May 8, 1992 (R. 110); however, because the 
unsigned order did not constitute a final order, the appeal was dismissed for lack of 
jurisdiction on September 15, 1992 (R. 113-114). 
A second notice of appeal was filed on November 9, 1992 (R. 122). On August 4, 
1993, the Utah Court of Appeals remanded the case with instructions that explicit findings of 
fact and conclusions of law be made as to whether the corpus delicti rule was properly 
applid. State v. Hansen, 857 P.2d 978 (Utah App. 1993) (R. 196-198). 
A remand hearing (oral arguments) took place on January 5, 1994, before the 
Honorable Joseph I. Dimick, Fourth District Circuit Court, where Mr. Hansen's previous 
convictions were confirmed (R. 259). On January 11, 1994, Mr. Hansen made a motion to 
reconsider (R. 206-208). A sentencing hearing was held on January 19, 1994, where Mr. 
Hansen's motion to reconsider was denied and his sentence was stayed pending the perfection 
of an appeal (R. 286). 
On February 16, 1994, Mr. Hansen filed a notice of appeal with the Utah Court of 
Appeals (R. 213). However, on May 3, 1994, that appeal was dismissed for lack of a signed 
final order (R. 286-87, 299-300). On or about June 9, 1994 a signed order by Judge Dimick 
containing findings of fact and conclusions of law confirming Mr. Hansen's guilt was filed 
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(R. 306-307); and on or about June 14, 1994, a notice of appeal was again filed by Mr. 
Hansen with the Utah Court of Appeals (R.309-310) challenging that conclusion of law. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
Mr. Hansen was tried and convicted at bench trial on January 30, 1992, of leaving 
the scene of an injury accident and driving with a suspended license (R. 193). Independent 
of Mr. Hansen's confession, evidence presented by the state showed a single car rollover 
occurred on 1-15 North on September 7, 1991. The car came to rest on the passenger side 
of the car, and the only available exit from the car was the driver's door. An unidentified 
man in a blue jacket and red shirt was seen climbing up and out of that door, though no 
witnesses could testify as to whether the man was the driver or the passenger. This same 
man went to a nearby grove of trees, then recrossed the highway and hitchhiked north. 
There was a second occupant in the car at the time of the accident who was thrown from the 
vehicle, pinned under it, and received mortal injuries to the head. State v. Hansen, 857 P.2d 
978, 979 (Utah App. 1993). 
Approximately twenty-five hours later police arrested David Laird Hansen who was 
wearing clothes similar to those described by witnesses on the previous day. (R. 193 at 42-
47). Mr. Hansen was a passenger in a car traveling on 1-15 when he was arrested the day 
after the accident. (R. 193 at 48.) During subsequent questioning by police, Mr. Hansen 
stated that he had been driving the car at the time of the accident. (R. 193 at 43). 
Based on the foregoing facts, Mr. Hansen was convicted of leaving the scene of an 
accident and driving with a suspended license. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in concluding the state had carried its burden of proof and Mr. 
Hansen was guilty as charged. In order to find Mr. Hansen guilty of 1) leaving the scene of 
an injury accident and 2) driving with a suspended license, the state must first prove the 
corpus delicti of each crime. The corpus delicti may only be proved with evidence 
independent of the defendant's admission. Once the corpus delicti has been established, then 
the defendant's statements may be introduced as evidence. 
On the charge of leaving the injury accident, the state must prove by independent 
evidence that the driver and not the passenger left the scene of the accident. Only then can 
Mr. Hansen's statements be used to prove he was the driver. Upon remand from the Court 
of Appeals, the trial court found the independent evidence was inconclusive as to whether the 
driver left the scene. Therefore the corpus delicti could not be established. Despite this 
finding the trial court ruled Mr. Hansen was guilty of both crimes. This conclusion of law is 
in direct opposition to the findings of fact and the holdings of the Court of Appeals. It 
should be reversed under a correction of error standard. 
Mr. Hansen's second conviction for driving with a suspended license should be 
vacated for the same reasons. In order to prove this crime, the state must first show by 
independent evidence that the operator of the vehicle had a suspended license. The state has 
only demonstrated that Mr. Hansen's license was suspended, not that the driver of the 
vehicle had a suspended license. Thus the state has not carried its burden. Because the 
corpus delicti of this crime has not been established, this conviction should also be vacated. 
5 
The correction of error standard is the proper standard of review for challenging 
conclusions of law in a criminal case. In applying this to the trial court's erroneous 
conclusion of law, this court should review the findings of fact and reverse the trial court's 
decision. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THE STATE HAD CARRIED ITS 
BURDEN OF PROOF AFTER THE COURT FOUND THER WAS NO EVIDENCE 
INDEPENDENT OF THE DEFENDANT'S CONFESSION TO ESTABLISH THE 
DRIVER HAD LEFT THE ACCIDENT SCENE 
A. THE CORPUS DELICTI RULE MUST BE SATISFIED BEFORE MR. HANSEN'S ADMISSION IS 
ADMITTED AS EVIDENCE 
Corpus Delicti is the objective proof that a crime has been committed. In this case, 
Mr. Hansen was charged with leaving the scene of an injury accident and driving with a 
suspended driver's license. The state must establish corpus delicti or proof of these two 
crimes by clear and convincing evidence, independent of the defendent's confession. If the 
state establishes corpus delicti, then the defendant's confession may be introduced in court. 
This rule has recently been restated and clarified by the Utah Supreme Court in State 
v. Johnson. 821 P.2d 1150, 1162 (Utah 1991) (quoting State v. Knoefler. 563 P.2d 175, 176 
(Utah 1977)): "Corpus delicti must be established through evidence, independent of the 
confession or admission, that the 'injury specified . . . occurred, and that such injury was 
caused by someone's criminal conduct.'" After a review of Utah's corpus delicti case law, 
the court went on to find that the requirement of clear and convincing evidence for corpus 
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delicti in State v. Ferry, 275 P.2d 173 (Utah 1954) was still followed by the court. Johnson, 
821 P.2dat 1163. 
Thus, the Johnson rule places three requirements on the state for establishing the 
corpus delicti of the crime: 
1) The state must prove the occurrence of a crime, wrong, or injury; 
2) The state must prove the crime, wrong, or injury was caused by 
someone's criminal conduct; and 
3) The evidence must be clear and convincing, and independent of the 
defendant's confession. 
The state did not meet these requirements at trial. 
B. IN ORDER TO SATISFY THE CORPUS DELICTI RULE, THE TRIAL COURT MUST BE 
CONVINCED BY INDEPENDENT EVIDENCE THAT THE DRIVER LEFT THE SCENE OF THE 
ACCIDENT 
Mr. Hansen was charged with leaving the scene of an injury accident. To find him 
guilty of the crime, the state must show that the driver left the scene of the accident. It is 
not a crime for a passenger involved in an injury accident to leave the accident scene. The 
crime occurs when the operator of the car leaves the scene. Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-29 
(1988). Therefore, in order to prove the occurrence of a crime, wrong, or injury as defined 
by Johnson, the state must provide clear and convincing evidence that the person who left the 
scene was the driver of the vehicle and not a passenger. To prove the driver left the scene, 
the state may only use evidence independent of the defendant's admission. 
After proving the driver left the accident scene, the corpus delicti of the crime has 
been established. To find Mr. Hansen guilty of the alleged crimes, the state must then show 
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that the driver of the car was Mr. Hansen. The state may use Mr. Hansen's admission to 
prove this fact, but not before the corpus delicti has been established.1 
The corpus delicti rule is a "safeguard against convicting the innocent on the strength 
of a false confession." Johnson, 821 P.2d at 1162 (quoting State v. Weldon, 314 P.2d 353, 
357 (Utah 1957)). If a crime can be established only on the basis of the defendant's 
statements, there is too great a chance for abuse in the system. There must be sufficient 
evidence, independent of the defendant's statements, to prove the crime. 
In Mr. Hansen's first appeal this court declared: 
In order for the State to establish the corpus delicti of the crime specified in 
section 41-6-29, the State must establish by clear and convincing evidence that 
the person who left the scene was in fact the driver of the vehicle and not 
merely a passenger. Such evidence may not include defendant's admission that 
he was driving. 
Hansen, 857 P.2d at 980 (emphasis added). In reviewing the trial court's first decision, this 
court found there were ambiguous references to Mr. Hansen's admission, giving the 
appearance that the "trial court may have improperly used defendant's admission to find that 
the person who left the scene was the driver of the car." Id. at 981. The Court of Appeals 
concluded, "If this is the case, the trial court incorrectly applied the corpus delicti rule." IcL 
*In State v. Hansen, 857 P.2d 978, 980 (Utah App. 1993), this court made a clear 
distinction between finding the driver had left the scene of the accident and finding the 
defendant was the driver at the time of the accident. The first finding must be demonstrated 
in order to establish the corpus delicti of the crime. The latter determination need not be 
proven to establish the corpus delicti. "The question considered when establishing corpus 
delicti is whether a crime was in fact committed, not who committed the crime, (citations 
omitted) The question of who actually committed the crime may be answered by the 
defendant's admission once the corpus delicti is established." IcL; State v. Knoefler, 
563 P.2d 175, 176 (Utah 1977). 
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Due to the inadequacy of the trial court's findings, the matter was remanded for "an 
explicit determination of whether the corpus delicti of the crime ha[d] been properly 
established without resort to defendant's admission." Hansen, 857 P.2d at 981. 
C. ON REMAND, THE TRIAL COURT DETERMINED THE CORPUS DELICTI OF THE CRIME 
COULD NOT BE ESTABLISHED WITHOUT DEFENDANT'S ADMISSION 
Upon remanding the matter to the trial court, this court stated the conviction should 
be vacated if the trial court did not find the corpus delicti of the crime had been properly 
established without using Mr. Hansen's admission. Hansen, 847 P.2d at 981. This 
instruction was not followed by the Fourth Judicial Circuit Court. 
In the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Final Order, dated June 9, 1994, 
the trial court found: 
3) The state has established that an unknown person exited the vehicle involved in 
the accident and fled. (Transcript of hearing p. 34. hereinafter T) (emphasis 
added). 
4) That if there is evidence from any source to establish that the person 
who exited the vehicle is the driver, then the corpus of the crime is 
established. (T. p. 34 lines 5-8). 
(R. at 306-07). The Court of Appeals stated the corpus delicti rule was satisfied if the trial 
court was convinced it was the driver who left the scene, not an unknown person. In 
addition, the Court of Appeals ruled the evidence could not come from Mr. Hansen's 
admission. The term "any source" seems to imply the inclusion of the admission, but corpus 
delicti must be established before the admission is allowed into court. 
The trial court further found: 
5) The confession of the defendant establishes that he is the driver. (T. p. 
34 lines 8-9). 
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6) The court finds that independent of defendants [sic] confession the 
record is silent on identity. (T. p. 34, line 25 and p. 22 line 10-12, p. 
23 line 20-22, p. 24). 
(R. at 306). These findings do not reach the question of whether the driver left the scene of 
the accident. The driver's identity is not an element of the corpus delicti. 
Most importantly the court stated: 
7) The court finds that independent of the defendant's confession the 
record is inconclusive on the issue of whether the deceased was the 
driver of the vehicle or the person who left the accident was the driver 
of the vehicle. (T. p. 24, lines 2-6, p. 23, lines 20-24, p. 30, lines 3-
4). 
(R. at 306.) Although the finding of fact is not phrased in the exact manner requested by the 
Court of Appeals (i.e. the court finds that independent of the defendant's confession the 
record is inconclusive on the issue of whether the driver of the vehicle left the accident), it is 
clear the trial court was unable to determine if the driver of the vehicle was the person seen 
leaving the scene of the accident. Thus, without Mr. Hansen's admission, the state did not 
establish by clear and convincing evidence that the person who left the scene was the driver 
and not the passenger. Without this proof, the corpus delicti rule is not satisfied. Without 
proper establishment of corpus delicti, the conviction must be overturned. 
D. THE TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSION OF LAW DOES NOT CORRECTLY FOLLOW ITS 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
Upon the findings mentioned above, the trial court gave its conclusion of law as 
follows: "The Court concludes that with the evidence presented along with the confession of 
the defendant, the state has carried its burden of proof. Therefore the Court finds the 
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defendant guilty as charged." This conclusion does not logically follow from the findings of 
fact. 
In Mr. Hansen's earlier appeal, this court stated what the trial court should conclude 
based on its findings: 
We therefore remand the matter for an explicit determination of whether the 
corpus delicti of the crime has been properly established without resort to 
defendant's admission. If the trial court so finds, the conviction may stand. If 
not, the conviction should be vacated. 
Hansen, 857 P.2d at 981. The trial court found that without Mr. Hansen's confession the 
record was inconclusive concerning the identity of the person who left the scene of the 
accident. The driver was as likely to be the deceased as the person who walked away. 
Without proof that the driver left the accident, the corpus delict rule was not satisfied, and 
Mr. Hansen's confession should not have been brought before the court. Accordingly, the 
burden of proof was not met by the state and the conviction should be overturned. 
E. WITHOUT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CORPUS DELICTI, THE SECOND CONVICTION 
MUST ALSO BE VACATED 
Mr. Hansen was further convicted of driving with a suspended license. The 
applicable crime specified under Utah Code Annotated § 41-2-136 occurs when a person 
whose license has been suspended operates a motor vehicle upon Utah highways while the 
license is suspended. It is not a crime for a person with a suspended license to be a 
passenger in a car. Thus the state must show that the driver of the vehicle in this case had a 
suspended license. This must be shown by independent evidence. Hansen, 857 P.2d at 981. 
Only after the state establishes the corpus delicti can Mr. Hansen's admission be used to 
show that he was the driver of the vehicle. 
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There are several ways the state could have shown through independent evidence that 
the driver of the vehicle had a suspended license. If the state had established both occupants 
in the car had suspended licenses, the state would have proved the driver, as one of the 
occupants, was committing a crime. If the state had given independent evidence from a 
police officer who observed Mr. Hansen driving, the state would have established the corpus 
delicti.2 If the state's witnesses had identified Mr. Hansen as the vehicle driver, this would 
also have provided the independent evidence needed to verify the crime. The state has done 
none of these things. Instead the state contends that Mr. Hansen's admission establishing his 
identity in the first conviction may be used for the second conviction. 
It is true that once the corpus delicti has been independently established for a criminal 
charge and a defendent's admission is allowed into evidence, the admission may then be used 
to establish the corpus delicti of another crime involving the defendant in the same action. 
Hansen, 857 P.2d at 981. However, in this case, the state has not established the corpus 
delicti of the first charge. Mr. Hansen's admission is not allowed as evidence unless the 
state can establish the driver left the scene of the accident. Because the state did not carry 
this burden of proof, Mr. Hansen's admission may not be used as evidence in the second 
charge of driving with a suspended license. 
The court can only admit Mr. Hansen's statements if the state proves through 
independent evidence that either the driver left the injury accident or the driver was operating 
the vehicle with a suspended license. The state has not been able to establish the corpus 
2The suspension of Mr. Hansen's license has been established by independent evidence 
and is not in question. 
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delicti of either of these crimes through independent evidence. Accordingly, Mr. Hansens's 
statements may not be used and the convictions must be vacated. 
In Mr. Hansen's first appeal, this court remanded with "instructions that explicit 
findings of fact and conclusions of law be made as to whether the State has independently 
established the corpus delicti of both crimes." Hansen, 857 P.2d at 981. The trial court 
made no findings concerning whether the driver had a suspended license, and as stated 
previously, found the independent evidence was inconclusive on the issue of whether the 
person who left the vehicle was the driver (R. at 306). It follows that without establishment 
of the corpus delicti of either crime, Mr. Hansen cannot be guilty as charged. The circuit 
court's conclusion of law is incorrect according to this court's holdings and should be 
reversed. 
F. REVIEWING THE LOWER COURT'S DECISION UNDER A CORRECTION OF ERROR 
STANDARD RESULTS IN REVERSAL 
A trial court's conclusions of law in criminal cases are reviewed for correctness. 
Judge Norman H. Jackson, Utah Standard of Appellate Review, Utah Bar Journal, October 
1994, at 9, 23; State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256, 1271 (Utah 1993); State v. Haves. 860 
P.2d 968, 971 (Utah App. 1993). This standard is also referred to as a correction of error 
standard, and is defined by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 936 
(Utah 1994): "Controlling Utah case law teaches that 'correctness' means the appellate court 
decides the matter for itself and does not defer in any degree to the trial judge's 
determination of law." 
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In Mr. Hansen's case, the trial judge issued his findings of fact and from these 
concluded that with the evidence and Mr. Hansen's confession, the state has carried its 
burden of proof and Mr. Hansen was guilty as charged (R. at 306). According to the 
correction of error standard, this court does not defer to the trial judge's ruling but decides 
the matter for itself. In viewing the findings of fact determined by the trial court on remand, 
and the holdings of this court on the first appeal, the logical conclusion of law is the vacating 
of the convictions. Without Mr. Hansen's statements, the corpus delicti cannot be 
established for either crime. The conclusion of the trial court is error and should be 
corrected by this court. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Hansen respectfully requests the Court of Appeals 
reverse the decision of the lower court and vacate Mr. Hansen's convictions, holding the 
corpus delicti was not established and therefore, the trial court's conclusion of law on 
remand was in error. 
Respectfully submitted this day of November, 1994. 
M 
Cleve J. Hatcl 
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant 
Margaret P. Lindsay 
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant 
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978 U t a h 857 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
record until late 1990 or early 1991. If this 
court were to perceive an implied contract 
to employ Evans for a definite time period 
based upon these representations, then an 
employer could never tell a potential em-
ployee in a job interview what was expect-
ed of him or her over the next few months 
or years without creating such a contract. 
Implying a contract on this basis would 
impermissibly undercut the presumption 
that employment contracts are at-will. 
Alternatively, even viewing the facts 
most favorably to Evans, and assuming 
that GTE did promise Evans that he would 
not be terminated before the end of 1990 
on the basis of inadequate sales, it is impor-
tant to bear in mind the "narrowness of the 
implied-in-fact contract term that [the dis-
charged employee's] allegations would sup-
port." Sanderson v. First Sec. Leasing 
Co., 844 P.2d 303, 307 (Utah 1992). In 
Sanderson, plaintiff was allegedly prom-
ised that he would not be discharged for 
being unable to work due to an illness. 
The court noted, however, that the employ-
er "retained his at-will prerogative to fire 
Sanderson at any time for any other rea-
son." Id. (emphasis in original). In Ev-
ans's case, a promise to give him until late 
1990 or early 1991 to close sales would 
mean, at most, that GTE could not fire 
Evans in the summer of 1990 based solely 
upon his sales record. Following the rea-
soning in Sanderson, Evans could not ex-
pand this promise to bar termination on 
other grounds, including GTE's decision to 
discontinue the IBM program. In all other 
respects, the employment relationship be-
tween Evans and GTE would remain at-
will. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court correctly ruled that no 
reasonable jury could find that Evans and 
GTE entered into an implied employment 
contract for a specified duration of time. 
For this reason, we affirm the trial court's 
grant of summary judgment to GTE. 
GARFF and ORME, JJ., concur. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
David Laird HANSEN, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 920823-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Aug. 4, 1993. 
Defendant was convicted in the Fourth 
Circuit Court, American Fork Department 
Robert J. Sumsion, J., of leaving scene of 
injury accident and driving with suspended 
driver's license, and he appealed. The 
Court of Appeals, Bench, J., held that de-
fendant's postcrime inculpatory statements 
were insufficient to establish defendant's 
guilt absent any clear and convincing evi-
dence independent of confession that crime 
occurred. 
Remanded with instructions. 
1. Criminal Law <s=>412(6), 535(2) 
Postcrime inculpatory statement r :uf-
ficient to establish guilt of defendant only 
if there is clear and convincing evidence 
independent of confession that crime actu-
ally occurred. 
2. Criminal Law <£=>563 
It is permissible to use reasonable in-
ferences drawn from evidence presented to 
establish corpus delicti. 
3. Automobiles e=>336 
It is not crime for passenger in car 
involved in injury accident to leave scene of 
accident, although it is crime for operator 
to leave. U.C.A.1953, 41-6-29. 
4. Automobiles <3=>355(8) 
Criminal Law <£=>409(7) 
To establish corpus delicti o f J j j j f 
meanor of leaving scene of injury acrid** 
STATE v. HANSEN 
Cite as 857 P.2d 978 (UUhApp. 1993) 
state must establish by clear and convinc-
ing evidence that person who left scene 
r^as in fact driver of vehicle and not merely 
passenger, and that evidence may not in-
clude defendant's admission of driving. 
U.C.A.1953, 41-6-29. 
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Cleve J. Hatch, Provo, for defendant and 
appellant. 
Benjamin T. Davis, Provo, for plaintiff 
and appellee. 
5# Criminal Law <s=>409(7) 
Question of who actually committed 
crime may be answered by defendant's ad-
mission once corpus delicti is established; 
corpus delicti may not be established solely 
by defendant's admission. U.C.A.1953, 41-
^29, 41-6-63.10(2). 
g. Automobiles <s=>326 
It is not crime to be passenger in car 
tfhen one's license is suspended. U.C.A. 
1953, 41-2-136, 41-6-44.10. 
7. Automobiles <£»326 
To show operation of vehicle by person 
whose license is suspended, state must 
show by independent evidence that driver 
of car had suspended license; if state had 
shown that both of car's occupants had 
suspended licenses, state would necessarily 
have shown that one of occupants was driv-
ing with suspended license. 
8. Criminal Law <£=>412(6) 
Once postcrime inculpatory statement 
is admitted to establish identity of defen-
dant in one charged crime in which corpus 
delicti has already been independently es-
tablished, statement may then be used to 
establish corpus delicti of another crime 
involving defendant in same admitted ac-
tion. 
1 Criminal Law <s=>409(6.1, 7) 
- 11 defendant's admission that Vie was 
driving when accident occurred is deter-
mined to be reliable and allowed in as evi-
dence that it was defendant who illegally 
*W scene of accident, admission that he 
**« driving may then be used to establish 
**pus delicti of crime of driving on sus-
IjjGded driver's license; if admission is not 
"wed in on charge of leaving accident, 
|**te must produce other independent evi-
***** that defendant was driving with sus-
s e d license. 
Before BENCH, GREENWOOD and 
RUSSON, JJ. 
BENCH, Judge: 
Defendant, David L. Hansen, appeals his 
conviction of a class A misdemeanor for 
leaving the scene of an injury accident in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-29 
(1988), and his conviction of a class B mis-
demeanor for driving with a suspended 
driver's license in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 41-2-136 (Supp.1991). We remand 
for additional findings. 
FACTS 
A single-car rollover occurred on Septem-
ber 7, 1991 on Interstate 15. The car 
crossed the median, rolled one and a quar-
ter times, and came to rest on the passen-
ger's side. One occupant was pinned be-
neath the car and suffered fatal head 
wounds. Witnesses observed another occu-
pant emerge from the car through the driv-
er's door and then run into a nearby grove 
of trees. Witnesses saw him then emerge 
from the grove, return to the highway, and 
hitchhike away. Before officers arrived at 
the accident, bystanders had pushed the 
car back to an upright position in an at-
tempt to help the injured occupant. None 
of the State's witnesses could say if the 
man who left the car was the driver, or if 
the man pinned beneath the car was the 
driver. 
The next day, alter receiving information 
from a confidential informant, the police 
stopped a vehicle in which defendant was a 
passenger. During questioning, defendant 
admitted to being the driver in the rollover. 
He indicated that he was driving when the 
victim, who was very drunk, grabbed the 
wheel. Defendant explained that the vehi-
cle rolled when he over-corrected and lost 
control. Defendant was charged with leav* 
ing the scene of an accident and driving 
with a suspended license. 
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At trial, defendant moved to dismiss both 
charges, claiming the State did not estab-
lish the corpus delicti of the crimes by clear 
and convincing evidence independent of his 
admission that he was driving. The motion 
was denied and defendant was found guilty 
on both counts. Defendant appeals, assert-
ing that the trial court misapplied the cor-
pus delicti rule. 
ANALYSIS 
Corpus Delicti Rule 
[1,2] A post-crime inculpatory state-
ment is sufficient to establish the guilt of a 
defendant only when there is clear and 
convincing evidence independent of the con-
fession that the crime actually occurred. 
State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150; 1163 
(Utah 1991). 
An admission or a confession, without 
some independent corroborative evidence 
of the corpus delicti, cannot alone sup-
port a guilty verdict. To sustain a con-
viction, the requirement of independent 
proof of the corpus delicti requires only 
that the State present evidence that the 
injury specified in the crime occurred, 
and that such injury was caused by 
someone's criminal conduct. 
State v. Knoefler, 563 P.2d 175, 176 (Utah 
1977); see also Johnson, 821 P.2d at 1162 
n. 8. It is permissible to use reasonable 
inferences drawn from the evidence pre-
sented to establish the corpus delicti. See 
State v. Cooley, 603 P.2d 800, 802 (Utah 
1979). 
Leaving the Scene 
[3,4] It is not a crime for a passenger 
in a car involved in an injury accident to 
leave the scene of the accident Utah Code 
Ann. § 41-6-29 (1988) provides: 
(1) The operator of a vehicle involved in 
an accident resulting in injury to or death 
of any person shall immediately stop the 
vehicle at the scene of the accident* or as 
close to it as possible and shall immedi-
1. In an attempt to show that a crime was com-
mitted, the State improperly asserts for the first 
time on appeal that the car crossed the highway 
median in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-
63.10(2) (1988). The defendant was not so 
ately return to and remain at the scene 
of the accident until he has fulfilled the 
requirements of section 41-6-31. The 
stop may not obstruct traffic more than 
is necessary. 
(2) A person failing to stop or to comply 
with the requirements of Subsection (\\ 
is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(Emphasis added.) 
In order for the State to establish the 
corpus delicti of the crime specified in sec-
tion 41-6-29, the State must establish by 
clear and convincing evidence that the per-
son who left the scene was in fact the 
driver of the vehicle and not merely a pag. 
senger.1 Such evidence may not include 
defendant's admission that he was driving. 
[5] Defendant argues that the State 
must present independent evidence of his 
identity as the driver as part of the corpus 
delicti of the crime. This assertion is incor-
rect. "[T]he connection of the accused 
with the crime need not be proven to estab-
lish the corpus delicti." Knoefler, 663 P.2d 
at 176. The question considered when es-
tablishing corpus delicti is whether a crime 
was in fact committed, not who committed 
the crime. See State v. Cazier, 521 ?.2d 
554, 555 (Utah 1974); State v. Johnson, 95 
Utah 572, 83 P.2d 1010, 1014 (1938). The 
question of who actually committed the 
crime may be answered by the defendant's 
admission once the corpus delicti is estab-
lished. Knoefler, 563 P.2d at 176. 
The record is unclear as to whether the 
trial court was convinced that the occupant 
who left the accident scene was the driver 
based only on the State's independent evi-
dence. There is no express finding by the 
trial court that the State had established 
the corpus delicti with independent en-
dence, as there should have been once the 
issue was raised. The trial court only sfrfr 
ed that the "confession puts him in the 
driver's seat," and that "the confess!* 
makes the difference." From these brirf 
charged and this argument was not presented* 
trial. Appellate courts will not hear ******!& 
are raised for the first time on appealv-^JL 
Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 925 (Utah App.1*1* 
STATE v. HANSEN 
Cite as 837 P.2d 9l* (UuhApp. 1993) 
ainbiguous references, it appears that the 
^al court may have improperly used de-
fendant's admission to find that the person 
who left the scene was the driver of the 
car. K this is the case, the trial court 
incorrectly applied the corpus delicti rule. 
On the other hand, if the trial court was 
convinced that it was the driver who left 
l^ e scene—without relying on defendant's 
admission—then the corpus delicti rule was 
satisfied. The reference to the confession 
putting defendant in the driver's seat 
w0Uld relate only to the trial court's deter-
mination of who committed the crime, not 
the determination that a crime was actually 
committed. 
The trial court's findings are inadequate 
for us to determine on review the steps 
taken by the trial court in reaching the 
decision it did. We do not know if the trial 
court properly found that the corpus delicti 
toA been established independent of the 
admission. This is a question that must be 
resolved at the trial court level. We there-
fore remand the matter for an explicit de-
termination of whether the corpus delicti of 
the crime has been properly established 
without resort to defendant's admission. 
If the trial court so finds, the conviction 
may stand. If not, the conviction should be 
vacated. 
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(3Xa) A person is guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor whose conviction under 
Subsection (1) is based on his operating a 
vehicle while his license is suspended or 
revoked for: 
(i) a refusal to submit to a chemical 
test under Section 41-6-44.10. 
(Emphasis added.)2 
[7] Since the applicable crime specified 
in section 41-2-136 is the operation of a 
vehicle by a person whose license is sus-
pended, the State must show by indepen-
dent evidence that the driver of the car had 
a suspended license. Had the State shown 
that both of the car's occupants had sus-
pended licenses, then the State would nec-
essarily have shown that one of the occu-
pants was driving with a suspended license 
and that the crime was committed by some-
one. See Knoefler, 563 P.2d at 176 (hold-
ing that since one of the car's occupants 
had to have been driving, and all three 
were drunk, then someone must have been 
driving under the influence of alcohol). 
The State, however, has not asserted here 
that both occupants had suspended driver's 
licenses.3 
Driving on a Suspended License 
[6] Defendant challenges his conviction 
for driving with a suspended license on the 
tame grounds. It is clearly not a crime to 
be a passenger in a car when one's license 
fc suspended. Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-136 
(Supp.1991) provides: 
(1) A person whose license has been de-
DifeA, suspended, disqualified or revoked 
tinder this chapter and operates any mo-
tor vehicle upon the highways of this 
state while that license is denied, sus-
pended, disqualified, or revoked shall be 
punished as provided in this section. 
IJJL^* i s n o debate that there is sufficient 
dependent evidence that defendant's driver's 
^^ F-nae had been suspended due to his refusal to 
*f*ait to a chemical test under section 41-6-
44.10. 
[8] Rather, the State asserts that once 
a post-crime inculpatory statement is ad-
mitted to establish defendant's identity in 
one charged crime where the corpus delicti 
has already been independently estab-
lished, the statement may then be used to 
establish the corpus delicti of another 
crime involving the defendant and the same 
admitted action. We agree. 
[9] The corpus delicti rule is a "safe-
guard against convicting the innocent on 
the strength of a false confession." John-
son, 821 P.2d at 1162 (quoting State v. 
Weldon, 6 Utah 2d 372, 375, 314 P.2d 353, 
357 (1957)). The requirement of indepen-
dent evidence of a crime helps to establish 
3. An alternative approach to establishing the 
corpus delicti of driving with a suspended li-
cense would be the typical scenario where the 
independent evidence is provided by the arresj^ 
ing police officer who personally observed the 
defendant driving. We have no such eyewitness 
evidence in this case. 
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the reliability of the inculpatory statement. 
Once the reliability of an inculpatory state-
ment has been established, however, the 
purpose of the corpus delicti rule has been 
satisfied. Therefore, if defendant's admis-
sion that he was driving when the accident 
occurred is determined to be reliable and 
allowed in as evidence that it was defen-
dant who illegally fled the scene of the 
accident, the admission that he was driving 
may then be used to establish the corpus 
delicti of the crime of driving on a suspend-
ed driver's license. If, on the other hand, 
the defendant's admission is not allowed in 
on the charge of leaving the accident scene, 
then the State must produce other indepen-
dent evidence that defendant was driving 
with a suspended license. In the latter 
scenario, if there is no other independent 
evidence to establish the corpus delicti of 
the crime, defendant's conviction for driv-
ing with a suspended license would have to 
be vacated. 
Once again, the trial court's findings are 
inadequate for us to determine whether the 
corpus delicti rule was properly applied. 
CONCLUSION 
We remand this matter with instructions 
that explicit findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law be made as to whether the 
State has independently established the 
corpus delicti of both crimes.4 
GREENWOOD and RUSSON, JJ., 
concur. 
(o I KEY NUMBER SYSTEM> 
4. We note that our remand is not intended to be 
a mere bolstering of the trial court's previous 
decision. See State v. Starnes, 841 P.2d 712, 716 
(Utah App.1992). The articulation of findings 
of fact and conclusions of law is an integral part 
of the decision making process. Adams v. 
Board of Review of Indus. Comm'n, 821 P.2d 1, 7 
(Utah App.1991). 
Once [a court] attempts to state its findings, 
identify the applicable law, and articulate its 
logic, it may discover that critical facts are 
The SIERRA CLUB, Utah 
Chapter, Petitioner, 
v. 
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
QUALITY, DIVISION OF SOLID AND 
HAZARDOUS WASTE, Respondent, 
and 
USPCI, Inc., Intervenor. 
No. 920485-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Aug. 5, 1993. 
Environmental group petitioned for ju-
dicial review of decision by Solid and Haz-
ardous Waste Control Board decision that 
application for commercial hazardous 
waste incinerator complied with the hazard-
ous waste facility siting criteria and that 
the permit application was complete. The 
Court of Appeals, Jackson, J., after raising 
standing issue sua sponte, held that: (l) 
any standing conferred by stipulation was 
lost when issues outside scope of stipula-
tion were raised; (2) environmental group 
sustained no distinct injury from alleged 
incompleteness; (3) environmental group 
was not most appropriate plaintiff; and (4) 
review of Board's internal operating proce-
dures did not involve issue of public impor-
tance. 
Dismissed. 
1. Action e»13 
Appeal and Error <3=>174 
Standing is issue that can be raised 
sua sponte at any time, including on ap-
peal. 
not properly before it, that the law is od«r 
than anticipated, or that its initial logic ii 
flawed. In such situations, a result conWJ 
to the initial conclusions of the [court! V0f 
be dictated. 
Id. at 7-8 (footnote omitted). It is thus imp* 
tive that the trial court fully and property £ 
evaluate the evidence before it when makiaf<* 
requisite findings on remand rather than ffl**v 
bolster the previous ruling by summaru^ 
hearsing the requisite findings. 
Tab 2 
CLEVE J. HATCH (560 9) 
Utah County Public Defenders Association 
40 South 100 West, Suite 200 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Telephone 379-2570 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, OREM DEPARTMENT 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW
 A/l/l) (Zj^/fL CRAG&$>/£> 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. : Case no. 935007055 
DAVID L. HANSEN, : 
Defendant. 
This matter came on for hearing on the fifth day of January, 
1994 before the Honorable Joseph I. Dimick. The State being 
represented by Ben Davis, Deputy Utah County Attorney, the 
defendant being represented by Cleve J. Hatch, of the Utah County 
Public Defenders Association. After hearing the matter the Court 
makes the following Findings of Fact: 
The Court finds by clearing and convincing evidence that: 
1. The state has established that an accident occurred. 
(Transcript of hearing p. 34. hereinafter T). 
2. The state has established that a person involved in the 
accident was fatally injured as a result of the accident. (T. p. 
34) . 
3. The state has established that an unknown person exited 
the vehicle involved in the accident and fled. (T. p. 34). 
4. That if there is evidence from any source to establish 
that the person who exited the vehicle is the driver, then the 
corpus of the crime is established. (T. p. 34 lines 5-8). 
5. The confession of the defendant establishes that he is 
the driver. (T. p. 34 lines 8-9). 
6. The court finds that independent of defendants 
confession the record is silent on identity (T. p. 34, line 25 
and p. 22 line 10-12, p. 23 line 20-22, p. 24 ). 
7. The court finds that independent of the defendant's 
confession the record is inconclusive on the issue of whether the 
deceased was the driver of the vehicle or che person who left the 
accident was the driver of the vehicle.(T. p. 24, lines 2-6, 
p.23, lines 20-24, t. 30 lines 3-4). 
Conclusion of law. 
The Court concludes that with the evidence presented along 
with the confession of the defendant, the state has carried its 
burden of proof. Therefore the Court finds the defendant guilty 
as charged. 
Dated this £?7> day of May, 1994. 
^ 
Honorable uoseoh I. uimick 
/ 
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